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Measurement is said to be the basis of exact sciences as the process of assigning
numbers to matter (things or their attributes), thus making it possible to apply the
mathematically formulated laws of nature to the empirical world. Mathematics and
empiria are best accorded to each other in laboratory experiments which function
as what Nancy Cartwright calls nomological machine: an arrangement generat-
ing (mathematical) regularities. On the basis of accounts of measurement errors
and uncertainties, I will argue for two claims: 1) Both fundamental laws of physics,
corresponding to ideal nomological machine, and phenomenological laws, corre-
sponding tomaterial nomologicalmachine, lie, being highly idealised relative to the
empirical reality; and also laboratory measurement data do not describe properties
inherent to the world independently of human understanding of it. 2) erefore
the naïve, representational view of measurement and experimentation should be
replaced with a more pragmatic or practice-based view.
Keywords: laboratory experiment, measurement theory, measurement uncertain-
ties, classical physics, nomological machine
1. Introduction
Physics is amathematical and empirical science—it treats theworld as quan-
tiable and calculable. e basis of such treatment is said to be measure-
ment, because measurement is the process of assigning numbers to matter,
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1 I add “classical physics” to emphasise that I am not dealing with quantum physics here,
which is usually regarded as the standard case for measurement problems, and that even in
classical physics, where measurement is oen cosidered to be unproblematic (see, e.g. the
citation of Chris Isham in the Introduction), it does involve ambiguities. Considerations of
(un)ambiguities, or even the meaning, of measurement in other areas (of physics) cannot be
addressed in this paper.
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thus enabling to apply alsomathematical tools to it.e importance of mea-
surement for physics is expressed by Piret Kuusk thus:2
Physics BEGINS with measurement, or more precisely—with choos-
ing three standard objects in the world that are assigned the meaning
of units by measuring three physical properties: space (length), time
andmass.e relation of the corresponding property of the sample to
the same property of the object under study yields the numerical ratio
or measured value, and these are the numbers from which begins the
mathematisation of physics. Physics is so mathematical because it is
a science of measurement and measured values.
In order for the mathematical laws of physics to be applicable to matter, the
matter must be expressed in a compatible form—numerical data. ese are
produced in laboratory experiments, where exact measurements can be car-
ried out.
e representational view of measurement regards the assigned num-
bers and scale of the quantity as characterising the matter itself that is being
measured, and science as exploring inherent properties of the world, and
measurement as disclosing the real values of those properties. It is advo-
cated both by scientists and by philosophers.us the physicist Chris Isham
(1995, 57; rst emphasis in original) says:
From the perspective of classical physics, the separation of observer
and system has no fundamental signicance. Observer and observed
are both parts of a single, objectively-existing world in which, on-
tologically speaking, both have equal status, and are potentially de-
scribable by the same physical laws. Similarly, there is nothing special
about the concepts of measurement or observable. e reason why a
measurement of an observable quantity yields one value rather than
another is simply because the quantity has that value at the time the
measurement is made.us properties are intrinsically attached to the
object as it exists in the world, andmeasurement is nothing more than
a particular type of physical interaction designed to display the value of
the specic quantity. Of course, this presupposes that “perfect” mea-
surements exist which have this desirable property of revealing what
is actually the case; such an assumption is not totally trivial;
and Nancy Cartwright (2002b, 6) says: “Measuring instruments have this
kind of ability to read nature.” Inmy paper I consider some of the theoretical
presumptions of measurement as the basis of physics and how the matter
studied does not conform to those presumptions.us I will argue for a less
representational and more pragmatic understanding of measurement.
2 In personal correspondence (my translation).
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In the second section I will briey introduce measurement theory and
its purported relation to the mathematical theory and laws of physics. In
the third section the notion of nomological machine will be considered, its
role in physics and its relation to measurement theory. I will discern two
modes and thence two roles of nomological machines (NM): the ideal NM
corresponding to or enacting phenomena or fundamental laws of physics,
and material NM corresponding to material experiment, producing data
and giving rise to phenomenological laws. e fourth and h sections
are expositions of my two main claims: 1) Not only fundamental, but also
phenomenological laws lie in the sense as Cartwright argues; and moreover,
measurement data do not describe the real properties of the world, not even
of the laboratory world, as it is independently of human understanding of
it. 2)erefore the naïve representational view of measurement and experi-
mentation should be replacedwith amore pragmatic or practice-based view.
2. Measurement theory and its relation with the mathematical
theory of (classical) physics
e two underlying notions ofmeasurement theory are “empirical relational
system” and “numerical relational system” (Suppes and Zinnes 1962, Hand
2004). Empirical relational system (ERS) is usually said to be a set of objects
that are compared to one another as to some chosen property X. I prefer
to regard the empirical relational system as dierent magnitudes of a prop-
erty that are compared to one another, because things can only make up
a system through a systematising idea. In measurement theory the idea is
discriminating the intricate material reality into sets of well dened prop-
erties, for example length, duration or mass, and these properties having
determinate relations concerning their intensity, like identity, more than or
less than, or concatenation. A numerical relational system (NRS) is a set of
numbers n assigned to an empirical relational system, and is supposed to
preserve the structure of it; that is, the system of numbers must preserve the
relations holding on the empirical relational system, and the operations that
can be performed on it. It makes up an arithmetic or type of scale. Measure-
ment theory deals with two fundamental problems: the problemof assigning
numbers or a numerical scale to objects or phenomena on the basis of a cho-
sen property (the problem of representation), and the problem of unique-
ness of the assigned scale (the problem of uniqueness). Measurement, on
this account, is nding a homomorphism between a system of objects and
a numerical system: n = M(X) (M stands for a measure function realising
the homomorphism). It is oen said that the relation between an ERS and a
NRS is isomorphism, but this can only hold if the ERS is regarded as a set of
dierent magnitudes of a property, hence as an abstract system (also Hand
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2004, 29).
David Hand (2004) discerns between representational and pragmatic
measurement. Representational measurement is about detecting the essen-
tial properties and relations of a real world system on the basis of empirical
knowledge about it, and formulating an idealised model, a NRS, which pre-
serves its inherent properties. Laws of physics, in this account, are the ide-
alised models of real world properties, or the axiomatic which characterises
the scale type of the quantity under study. For pragmatic measurement,
the choice of the arithmetic, and accordingly axiomatic, is based mainly
on considerations of practical usability for a particular purpose; the cho-
sen attributes and their values do not necessarily represent any real world
entities or relations. Hand thinks representational measurement to prevail
in physics. How concretely is the representational aspect of measurement
related to the mathematicalness of physics, that is—how the NRS or arith-
metic of numbers relates to the mathematical laws of physics, is expressed
by James Clerk Maxwell (1965, quotes in Boumans 2005, 853) thus: “all the
mathematical sciences are founded on relations between physical laws and
laws of numbers, so that the aim of exact science is to reduce the problems
of nature to the determination of quantities by operations with numbers”.
is assignment of numbers to an examined material setting (for example,
a laboratory setting in experiments), on the one hand gives to the part of
material world such a form (numerical “data”) which is comparable to the
mathematical laws of physics, and on the other hand enables to manipulate
this given form using mathematical principles true of that particular arith-
metic system.is is, then, howmeasurement is the basis of physics: an ERS
is an idealised model of the objects compared, and laws of nature (formu-
lated in physics) are the axioms characterising the mathematical operations
valid on the NRS or arithmetic assigned to it (Hand 2004, 28, 32). Briey
put, according to measurement theory, measurement as the basis of physics
presumes that the world has clear discernible properties, which can take on
determinate magnitudes detectable through mutual comparison of things
which have that property.
3. Nomological machine and measurement in laboratory
experiments
e reduction of material things to idealised properties or quantities re-
quires a nomological machine (NM), as also Marcel Boumans (2005) has
argued. He says that measurement theory only holds in a laboratory setting
which functions like a NM, or measuring instrument itself must function as
such. Cartwright (1999, 49) species:
[A nomological machine] is a xed (enough) arrangement of compo-
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nents, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort
of stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give
rise to the kind of regular behaviour that we represent in our scien-
tic laws.
I think the notion “nomological machine” can be understood in two ways:
as an ideal model, or as a material setting. As an ideal model I take it to
correspond to a mathematical law of physics, particularly what Cartwright
calls fundamental laws of physics; as such, it is a schema or model which
guides the enactment of a law in an experiment, but is also the aim of ex-
perimentation. As a material setting it is a laboratory experiment designed
according to the guidance of the fundamental law, and is to help establish
certain mathematical laws.is distinction roughly sidesteps James Wood-
ward’s account of the split between phenomena—“relatively stable and gen-
eral features of the world” reproducible with various material arrangements,
corresponding to ideal NMs—and data—“what registers on a measurement
or recording device”, susceptible to confounding circumstances and noise,
corresponding to outcomes of material NMs.e repeatability or regularity
of a NM pertains, respectively, either to phenomena, which must be gener-
atable with various material arrangements (replicability), referring to their
alleged ubiquitousness (see e.g. Woodward 1989); or to reliability ofmaterial
(measuring) devices.e two converge in the requirement that a purported
law must be reproducible both on the same and on diering experimental
set-ups.3
I take the ideal NM to correspond to a mathematical law of physics
X = f (Z1. . .n , a1. . .m), “a necessary regular association between proper-
ties antecedently regarded as OK” (Cartwright 1999, 49), or the properties
(X , Z1. . .n) which determine the “problems of nature” in scientic context.
According to this understanding, each Zi represents an attribute—aquantity
—of the real world system, and the formula shows how they can co-vary.
By substituting the variables with concrete numbers, representing concrete
magnitudes of those variables, one learns how the unknown X varies when
a system determined by those (and only those) properties is manipulated
accordingly. In this sense the ideal NM guides how a material NM, or a
physical experiment, is to be designed: which conditions (Z1. . .n) must be
realised, and what it means that possible confounding circumstances are
shielded o (what are the ceteris paribus conditions to be met, or rather ce-
teris neglectis—that the remaining circumstances aect the phenomenon ex-
amined to a minor or negligible degree, as they cannot in any way be totally
excluded, Boumans 2005).
3 Jaak Kikas in personal communication. See also (Radder 2003).
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I take NM as amaterial set-up to constitute the essence of laboratory ex-
perimentation in physics: “we expect the experimental design to be a design
for a nomological machine” (Cartwright 1999, 88). Experimentation has a
double task with respect to its guiding purportedmathematical law:4 to ma-
terially enact the phenomenon described by the law, and to provide empiri-
cal data to test the law. e aim is to construct an apparatus or a stand that
would approximate the ideal NM as close as possible by realising the inter-
action of the essential properties making up the phenomenon as free from
other circumstances as possible. Experiment is intimately linked to mea-
surement: “Whatever the nature of the experiment, it [the experiment] will
be constructed out of measurements. . . ” (Baird 1964, 89). is claim holds
in various senses, implicating dierent NMs:
Firstly and most essentially, measurements of the target quantity X for
varying values of independent (dening) quantities (Z1. . .n) provide the em-
pirical part of science—the data for testing the purported mathematical law.
ereby the sample of experimentation is rendered into an ERS (possible
magnitudes of X) by constructing the material NM, i.e. a measuring set-up,
approximating to the (or eventually an) ideal NMby creating ceteris neglectis
conditions. “Unless the nature of measurement is clear to the experimenter,
the benet which is sought from carrying out the experiment cannot be fully
realized” (Baird 1964, v).is claim must be seen on the background of the
mathematisation process mentioned above (in the quotation by Maxwell):
experiments are carried out in physics also when the nature of the phe-
nomenon of interest, hence also the nature of measurements (comparisons
of capacities or attributes with each other and/or with standards) performed,
are not yet clear5—otherwise there could be no evolvement of physical the-
ory and itsmathematical structure in relation to thematerial world; the ben-
et sought from experimentation is realised when the new phenomenon is
brought into the theory, under the mathematical and theoretical concepts of
physics. As soon as this is reached—as soon as one has a reliable mathemat-
ical representation for the phenomenon—experimentation has fullled its
task and nished.6 is assessed and qualied mathematics, I surmise, can
then be treated as a NM in the ideal sense of the notion. As such it can in-
struct about stable correlations to underlie further measuring instruments,
that is—comparison systems.
4 Experiments are also carried outwithout prior clear theoretical guidance, or the theoretical
question pursued may substantially change during experimentation (Hacking 1988, Hon
1989, Piret Kuusk and Jaak Kikas in personal communications); see also the next section
about this.
5 Piret Kuusk in personal communication.
6 Jaak Kikas in personal communication.
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Secondly, numbers are usually assigned not immediately to X, but to a
directly observable property Y , which is lawfully correlated with X: Y =
F(X); as it is also a function of other circumstances of the test situation
(n = M(Y) = M(F(X ,OC)), the measure function M being realised by a
measuring instrument; OC stands for ‘other circumstances’), the inuence
of those on its state and on the changing of its state must be small in relation
to the inuence of the target quantity X (Boumans 2005, 855, 861).7 Hence
the target and observable quantities, X and Y , must relate to each other like
a NM, Y = F(X ,OC), and so must the observable quantity and the scale
realising the assignment of a NRS to the created ERS, n = M(Y ,OC), OC
being negligible, the NM assigning the same number to a quantity each time
the latter appears with the same intensity; this is provided by stabilisation of
the phenomenon8 and calibration of the apparatus.
irdly, each of the dening quantities (Z1. . .n) is measured for ensur-
ing its purported value. Hence the apparatus that create and check for the
conditions must function as NMs—these are usually provided by previous
theoretical-experimental practices on those particular phenomena or quan-
tities.9
Fourthly, although elements of experiment are accounted for by some
theory or set of theories (depending on the element’s complexity), the ma-
terial realisations do not function exactly as the theory says, but instead of
analytic models phenomenological laws or even purely numerical models
oen have to be exploited in a mathematical description of the experimen-
tal set-up where many parameters due to materials have to be taken into ac-
count. So sometimes the “other circumstances” are also measured, which is
necessary for numerically determining their inuence on the phenomenon
and hence on the relation of what is considered as the essential features of
a phenomenon to “merely contingent factors” resulting of a particular ma-
terial realisation of it. It is even here possible to apply the notion of NM
accounting for the other factors inuencing the phenomenon: according to
Demetris Portides, in some cases the terms of the disturbing factors are rein-
serted into the idealised formula of the phenomenon. His account is based
on Cartwright’s notions of fundamental and phenomenological laws. Each
secondary factor (disturbing material eect) would be accountable for by
some fundamental law of some physical theory, and combining themwould
7 Boumans’ own example is about thermometer, where X stands for temperature and Y for
the height of themercury column,OC includes properties of thematerial that themercury
tube is made of.
8 See (Hacking 1988) about plasticity and stability of scientic laboratory practice.
9 E.g. (Hacking 1988), Piret Kuusk and Jaak Kikas in personal communications.
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provide an accurate description of what is going on in the experiment.10 To
wit, in the pendulum example analysed by Portides (2006) the following fac-
tors are enumerated:
(i) nite amplitude, (ii) nite radius of bob, (iii)mass of ring, (iv)mass
of cap, (v) mass of cap screw, (vi) mass of wire, (vii) exibility of wire,
(viii) rotation of bob, (ix) double pendulum, (x) buoyancy, (xi) lin-
ear damping, (xii) quadratic damping (xiii) decay of nite amplitude,
(xiv) added mass, (xv) stretching of wire, (xvi) motion of support.
For such a composing of factors in describing a material situation to be
possible, there should be known mathematical descriptions of each phe-
nomenon or factor in the composition, received as Cartwright (2002b, 190–
191) conjectures:
What is an ideal situation for studying a particular factor? It is a sit-
uation in which all other ‘disturbing’ factors are missing. And what
is special about that? When all other disturbances are absent, the fac-
tor manifests its power explicitly in its behaviour. When nothing else
is going on, you can see what tendencies a factor has by looking at
what it does.is tells you something about what will happen in very
dierent, mixed circumstances. . .
So, allegedly, when separate factors have been abducted, then they can be
(re)combined according to the requirements of particular situations. But, as
already mentioned, these factors cannot be extracted in pure form: there is
no such situation as “all other ‘disturbing’ factors [being]missing” (Boumans
2005, Portides 2009, D’Agostini 1999, Baird 1964).
e notion of NM is congruent with the representational understanding
of measurement: they both presuppose existence and discernibility of clear
mutually exclusive properties of real world objects and phenomena in terms
of quantities (quantiable attributes) or capacities correspondingly, that can
be represented with a mathematical formula. I see Woodward’s concept of
phenomenon to comply with Cartwright’s understanding of a law of nature
as conceived by an ideal NM: phenomena are independent of particular de-
tection device, that is, of contingencies of concrete material set-up, hence
their mathematical (numerical) composition must discount (it must be ex-
tracted from) noise produced by incidental side-eects inmaterial situations
(Woodward 1989, 396–397).e ideal NM embodying themathematical law
of nature would constitute the general conditions for the appearance of a
phenomenon and is thus a part of the theoretical explanation of it. A NM
10 Reinserting factors as described by Portides above may count as shiing some OCs from
n = M(F(X ,OC)) under Z i-s in X = f (Z i).
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is the precondition for factors to display their capacities in stable phenom-
ena that enable to (quantitatively) compare themwithout disturbing circum-
stances and thus detect the arithmetic to represent the capacities or quanti-
tative attributes. Woodward and Cartwright dier in the ontological status
that they assign to phenomena as so understood: whereas Woodward takes
them to pertain to the world, to be general features of the world and due
to their independence from contingent material circumstances thus non-
idiosyncratic, Cartwright, in contrast, takes them to be idiosyncratic due
to their dependence on highly articial, constructed conditions of occur-
rence, the conditions fullled by a NM; thence her claim that fundamental
laws of physics lie. Phenomenological laws are to describe numerically ex-
actly what is going on in a material setting. Cartwright regards these laws as
ontologically superior relative to fundamental laws describing phenomena,
because they pertain to the actual material world. Woodward, in contrast,
regards those as idiosyncratic, prone to errors and contingent factors inmea-
surement results, hence as ontologically inferior. To get phenomena out of
data, one must discount the errors as noise; phenomena must be extracted
by tuning to detect signal “in the sea of noise”, that includes experimental
design, control for errors and bias, measurement techniques and data anal-
ysis (Woodward 1989, 396–397). In the next section I will consider those
errors relating to measurement activity in laboratory, and their import on
data, and hence also on the NM that the experiment providing those data is
to be.
4. Measurement error and uncertainty in experiment: how laws
and data lie
I agree with Cartwright that the simple fundamental laws of physics do not
pertain to the real material world.ey describe something stable and sim-
ple, but thematerial world is intricate and changing. I also agree withWood-
ward that data produced by material experiments are idiosyncratic. Due to
their idiosyncrasies, also phenomenological laws do not pertain to the ma-
terial reality. eir theoretical mathematical components are as idealised
as fundamental laws, and their empirical numerical components depend
on particular measurement situations and presuppose the representational
view of measurement. If a concrete measurement act would embody a ma-
terial NM, it could be regarded as revealing the real properties of that con-
crete material situation. However, numerous sources of uncertainties in real
measurement render their results doubly fuzzy: as to their numerical mag-
nitude, and as to the property to which it is assigned. e outcome of a
single measurement event can be inuenced by various factors which are
considered as disturbing noise, “other circumstances”, error, that confound
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detection of the value of the measurand, thus rendering measurement pro-
cess uncertain. Uncertainties are said to be either of systematic nature (sys-
tematic error), or statistical nature (random error). Random error (listed 10
hereinaer) is reected in the reading only if a large number of small per-
turbations are present; systematic error is a “perturbation which inuences
all measurements of a particular quantity equally” (Baird 1964, 10). How-
ever, a type of error can travel from one category to the other (Baird 1964,
10), and as D’Agostini (1999, 8) states, there is no clear distinction between
systematic and statistical errors: all those considered as systematic eects
on measurement contribute to statistical eects; but moreover, this distinc-
tion is theory- or model-laden (Tal 2011b), and is based on purely numerical
grounds of discrimination (or mathematical, in contrast to the source of er-
ror as a discrimination criterion Hon 1989, 477).
Let us consider some of the various sources of errors and uncertainties
in measurement.11
(a) Instrument calibration uncertainty, which can only be removed
through comparison with a standard instrument;12 this should be checked
for before every experiment (this, however, is usually not done in physical
laboratory experiments);13 and 7) “inexact values of measurement standards
and reference materials”. As measurement (in the case of classical physics) is
comparison of the target object with the standard object (the unit, realised in
a form of an object like standard kilogram ormetre, or process like standard
second and metre), variability of the unit implies variability of the magni-
tudes of the same target measurand at dierent times, given that everything
else remains the same.14
3) “Non-representative sampling—the sample measured may not rep-
11 e lettered sources in this list are from Baird (1964, 11–14), numbered ones from
D’Agostini (1999, 7–8, quoting the ISO Guide); here I consider only few of the error and
uncertainty sources indicated by Baird and D’Agostini. e others are: (b) Instrument
reproducibility: the value of calibration under certain circumstances can be removed by
mechanical defects in slightly dierent circumstances; (c) Observer skill; (e) Fineness of
scale division; 1) “Incomplete denition of themeasurand”; 2) “Imperfect realisation of the
denition of the measurand”; 4) “Inadequate knowledge of the eects of the environmen-
tal conditions on the measurement, or imperfect measurement of environmental condi-
tions”; 5) “personal bias in reading analogue instruments”; 8) “Inexact values of constants
and other parameters obtained from external sources and used in the data-reduction al-
gorithm”; 9) “Approximations and assumptions incorporated in the measurement method
and procedure”.
12 Here, of course, the experimenter depends on the reliability of the standard instrument,
which is also just a material being, as given by D’Agostini as error source 7.
13 Jaak Kikas in personal communication.
14 (Tal 2011b,a) about the variability of standard second, (Riordan 2011) about the etalon of
the kilogram.
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resent the dened measurand”; this is based on the assumption that there
is something in the world (a possible material sample) that exactly corre-
sponds to the denition of the measurand, X = f (Zi). at could only
be the standard object, mentioned in the introduction, which itself denes
the measurand. However, it has itself more properties (“OC”) than just the
quantity X dened on its basis and is thus subject to material uncertainties
as referred to by (7) above.
6) “Finite instrument resolution or discrimination threshold”, or “intrin-
sic instrument inertia”, as an engineer would call it,15 that all measuring in-
struments are said to have: by this it is meant that the instrument is unable
to register all minute changes; instead, it integrates the measurement inputs
over small dierences—that also Cartwright concedes:
[W]e do not actually observe the real value of a quantity at a time.
Instead what we see is a long-time average over these values—long
compared to relaxation times in the objects themselves. By a coarse-
grained averaging, we can construct new quantities that are all com-
patible. We then claim that these new quantities, and not the origi-
nals, are the macroscopic observables that concern us. (Cartwright
2002a, 166)16
Hence the number received as an outcome of a measurement act does not
pertain to one concrete magnitude of the measured attribute, but rather to a
set or an interval of (possible) magnitudes.
(d) Miscellaneous error: “In an experiment involving more than one
or two variables or factors that inuence the nal measurement, there are
bound to be perturbations which inuence the nal reading.” Baird (1964,
94) expresses the same yet thus: very oen the “independent” variables that
are controlled (manipulated) in an experiment are in fact dependent on each
other; due to this ceteris paribus conditions cannot be met. But something
yet stronger can be claimed: that always, even in the seemingly simplest,
paradigmatic cases, there are plenty of physical factors that are not included
in the mathematical model but do interfere with the experiment situation,
aecting measurement results, and that cannot in any way be removed be-
cause they are inherent in the material realisation of the phenomenon stud-
ied (e.g. Portides, example above). Hence the number does not pertain to
a concrete single distinct property either, but rather to a set or “system” of
properties. us the reference of the number or reading is doubly fuzzy: as
15 Tõnis Mets in personal communication.
16 Here Cartwright seems to diverge from her statement about measuring instruments as
reading nature: measuring instruments appear to have no epistemic superiority in recog-
nising neither isolate properties of phenomena, nor their values.
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to the magnitude, or measured value (due to errors sources a, 7 and 6), and
as to the property that it is to be the magnitude of (error source d).
10) “Variations in repeated observations of the measurand under appar-
ently identical conditions”, also pointed out by Baird: that by repeating the
same measurement dierent outcomes or readings are received.is neces-
sitates statistical analysis of data and, as I see it, compels both D’Agostini and
Baird to urge that the true value of themeasurand cannot be known.e sta-
tistical analysis treats the set of readings as a statistical collection, of which
dierent indicators are calculated, like mean, standard deviation etc. us
it provides an idealised data model, which in nicest cases shows a Gaussian
curve, which helps to provide an estimate of the true value of the measur-
and (mean), precision of measurements on the particular instrument in the
particular conditions (standard deviation), so that further measurements in
other conditions (other values of the measured quantity) can be estimated
for precision and accuracy (Baird 1964, Hon 1989).
4.1 Ideality of measurement concepts
Let us notice in which ways the treatment and formulations of measurement
errors and uncertainties as given above are idealised:
Firstly, they presuppose that there are clear distinct properties—perhaps
even quantities—in the world. Cartwright expresses this presumption ex-
plicitly. is presumption is further manifested by the mathematical no-
tion ‘variable’ applied on a material set-up, and the notion ‘discrimination
threshold’, which presupposes pre-existent values and properties to be dis-
criminated, or read out of nature.e theoretical notion ‘inertia’ that is said
to characterise each measuring instrument, however ne, seems to hint to
the background belief that there is an ideal toward which the neness of in-
strument procedure can strive—namely perfectly displaying the true value
of the measured quantity. Similarly in Portides’ account of composition of
factors: ‘linear’ and ‘quadratic’ are characteristics of mathematical systems,
but here used to qualify empirical processes (“damping”) as if the material
system itself counted various kinds of damping in its behaviour, and as if
those were clearly separable from each other.at is, there are presumed to
be ERSs, or systems of measurable properties in the world. However, terms
making up a mathematical formula do not all correspond to distinguishable
or dened properties of the real world system17 (ERSs), not even in a labo-
ratory experiment which should serve to extract them from the rest of the
material world. So also Cartwright (1999, 152) admits:
17 anks to prof. RafaelaHillerbrand on a discussion on this issue and on Portides’ approach
given above.
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Contrary to strict empiricist demands, the concepts of physics gener-
ally do not pick out independently identiable or measurable prop-
erties. Its concepts, rather, build in—and thus cover up—the whole
apparatus necessary to get a nomological machine to work properly:
the arrangement of parts, the shielding and whatever it takes to set
the machine running.
But this statement makes it unclear, in what sense do NMs enact and test
fundamental laws about phenomena, and that a “factor manifests its power
explicitly in its behaviour.” In addition, it cannot count for the dispersion
of measurement outcomes received by repeating a test in apparently same
conditions, as it would still provide just one possible numerical value for
given initial and boundary conditions.
Secondly, attributes are dened as quantities in the theories tested, where
they have certain functions and aims, rather than mapped from the matter,
as its properties appear, into numbers: they are connected in mathematical
formulae that gain their meanings due to the assumption of numerically-
valuedness of their terms; this numericalness due to there being something
dened as a unit. Similarly, the nature of “noise” is dened (Rothbart 2007,
85, referring to Skoog and Leary 1992; italics added): “A noisy signal, by def-
inition, has a contaminating eect on the accuracy and precision of an an-
alytic signal by negatively inuencing the evolution of the signal within the
instrument.” To be sure, those mathematical denitions are accorded with
practical handling of the matter with respect to those attributes, but the the-
oretical background accompanies also this handling and interpretation of
its results.18 at is, NRSs are ideal theoretical denitions guiding measure-
ment and dening data and noise.
irdly, the outcome of onemeasurement is just one number, not a set of
numbers each pertaining to exactly one perturbing or perturbed “variable”
or factor involved; the one number does not by itself split up into “the true
value” of themeasurand and “confounding circumstances”, “error” or “noise”.
e splitting is done on the basis of theoretical preconceptions about the
measured quantity, the measuring arrangement and its functioning,19 and
of the statistically received idealised data model. Hence not only ‘quantity’
and ‘value’, but also ‘error’ and ‘noise’ are theoretically laden idealised terms.
Fourthly, as for a Gaussian normal distribution of measurement results
an innite set of measurements would be needed, which is trivially impos-
sible, the (back)inference from the mathematical model of the instrument
reliability (the Gaussian) to further, yet unrealised material measurement
situations amounts to in good faith extrapolating the idealised model of in-
18 See also (Radder 2003, Baird 1964, 100, 136).
19 See also (Tal 2011b).
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strument performance. Baird (1964, 30) is optimistic: a population of a par-
ticular reading “refers to the innite set of readings which could be made
with the apparatus, and thus provides a link between actual observations and
the statistical theory.” So he is treating an apparatus as if it could work like
an ideal NM—always identical with itself, not susceptible to material decay
and contingent confounding circumstances—which comes to a contradic-
tion, because it is exactly this susceptibility to confounding circumstances
that the statistical model is to measure. Or he treats the “idiosyncrasies” of
an apparatus as a NM—in a way similar to Portides’ account of the compo-
sition of secondary factors.
And hly, taking these uncertainties into account, what exactly does
replicability of results mean? How is it decided, given the scattering of in-
dividual measurement results, that a result has been replicated? Also Baird
(1964, 135–136) poses the question: “What [. . . ] is the justication for ac-
cepting any postulated ideal variation to describe a set of observations?”,
and also answers it: “the cause of science is best advanced by interpreting
the results [of measurement] in terms of [the theory tested].” Jaak Kikas ac-
knowledges a similar approach:20 leaning on the principle of Occam’s razor,
the mathematical formula is retained which conforms to the theory, is more
convenient to handle and implement in practice. Baird does warn about too
easily rejecting data that seem not to conform to the Gaussian: as Gaussian
curve approximates the axis innitely, there is some probability of legitimate
data lying outside the standard deviations. So the idealisedGaussian—a par-
ticular mathematical-statistical tool—is taken to legitimately represent em-
pirical input for a physical theory; moreover, pure mathematics (the Gaus-
sian), which is an even more highly idealised theory than a physical theory,
is deemed to be a legitimate advisor on material possibilities:21 here partic-
ularly on the possible material variation of “one and the same” process or
interaction.
5. Howmeasurement is pragmatic
Taking into account the described fuzziness of the notions underlying the
assumptions of measurement theory, what is the reference system, the ERS,
that the measurement assigns a NRS to? It may be the operations executed
(Suppes and Zinnes 1962, 4); or the averaged numerical outcome of mea-
surements, which is to instantiate one element of the constructed or enacted
ERS (that is, one particular magnitude of the target attribute X). I take it
20 In personal communication.
21 Here the NRS, whose axiomatic is statistics, is assigned to an ERS of a laboratory artefact—
a model of a measuring device.
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to be the operation of the apparatus as a whole that has here received an
idealised notation n = M(F(X ,OC)): more narrowly, the instrument in a
sense measures the entirety of interactions taking place in it, the intended
inputs, the unintended “noise”, through their mutual inuences to the n
we read on the dial; more broadly, an ERS refers to the whole history and
practice standing behind the particular measurement and giving sense and
meaning to it. Measurement as comparison of objects is guided by practical
needs and possibilities—how the objects are perceived and used, how they
are conceptualised through this perception and use, what roles they play
in handling and understanding the world around us. As Daniel Rothbart
(2007, 59) mentions, it was at rst in practical matters such as trade, navi-
gation and the like, not theories and science, that instruments realising as-
signments of numbers—“mathematical instruments”—came to be applied.
But things and processes were compared and counted long before, thereby
brought to understanding by units dened on the basis of immediate and
activity-related cognition, like anatomical units (digit, hand, foot, . . . ) or
procedural units (certain travelling distances, sowing areas, . . . ) (Hand 2004,
Ch. 7 on the (pre-)history of units of physics).e great variety of units and
their denoted magnitudes (e.g. dierent lengths of ‘foot’) accords varying
local or temporal customs and circumstances (e.g. ‘foot’ measures not only
length, but also the stature of the folk: health, bodily tness due to social
status or fertility of arable land, thereby conditioning people’s anatomical id-
iosyncrasies like height and length of feet). What is measured (the ERS) de-
pends on the “axiomatic” of the measurement procedure and arrangement,
as dierent procedures and arrangements comprise dierent idiosyncrasies
that will be reected in the outcome.22 So for example a distance whenmea-
sured in travelling time will mean something else than when measured in
feet; similarly the scale (NRS) of an attribute meaningful for one thing may
be meaningless for another (Hand 2004, 11): the weight of apples is not the
same as the weight of grain; the area of a poor agricultural land is not the
same as the area of a rich agricultural land. Here the notion ofNMas amech-
anism requiring ceteris neglectis conditions, and their dependence on prac-
tical aims becomes apparent: ‘a travelling distance’ presumes certain culture
and ways of travelling, certain tness of the traveller, a certain kind of land-
scape, a certain load to be carried, favourable weather, absence of threats
to the progression etc.—conditions presumably (implicitly) provided for by
the particular social and natural conditions; measuring an area in furrows
or scheels only makes sense if the measurand is an agricultural land, and
perhaps has a known fertility.
22 See e.g. (Tal 2011b) for an overview of the operationalist understanding of measurement;
he rejects it as not accordable with scientic practice.
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Science is one kind of practice, withmathematics as its ideal unique ker-
nel (Vihalemm 1979, 1989). Evolution of this kernel is intertwined with the
practices of instrument making, like optics for sciences and clock making,
and the introduction of measuring components into scientic (optical) in-
struments, thus rendering phenomena mathematical and introducing pre-
cision into the intricate world (Rothbart 2007, 59–63, Gooding 2003, 274).
But its beginning—measurement—has evolved during thousands of years
before these scientic instruments came into being, as hinted in the previ-
ous section and reported by Hand (2004, Ch. 7). Gooding (2003, 279) says:
units and quantication bring unity, regularity and unambiguous meaning
into nature—or rather, into our conception of nature, which guides us in
handling nature, whereby this unity and meaning is built into it, nature is
(re)constructed to bear meaningful and useful (for us) regularities,23 for ex-
ample in forms of experiments or various kinds of technology. So there
can be—it has a sense that there are—unied systems of measurement and
units only if there is technology to support such a system, if the units can be
multiply realised (by reproductions of the standard object or phenomenon,
and/or by dierent “material” denitions of the unit)24 and measurement
procedures with them carried out in stable ways. e assumption of iso-
morphism or homomorphism between empirical and numerical operations
is to ensure stability and certitude, as arithmetic or mathematics do not de-
pend on matter and its idiosyncrasies, but are assumed stable and apodictic
(Vihalemm 1979). In order to legitimately claim this stability and apodicity,
I surmise, physics must also introduce unied measurement system over
and above the multifarious local measuring systems. at is, it must treat
the world as if it was uniform (the assumption of uniform space and time
in Newtonian physics is to this end) and as if it made sense to measure ev-
erything according to the same standards, that is—compare all things with
the same etalons. ere are at least two kinds of abstraction in the evolving
practices of measurement: to numbers (e.g. that three apples, three seconds
and three acres of land are all instances of the same number: three) and to
attributes (e.g. that a nanometre, a yard or four yards, “seven lands and seas”
and a light year are all instances of the same attribute: length).ese are part
of abstraction from concrete things or processes to phenomena (as Wood-
ward understands them).25 Similarly to pre-scientic conceptualisation and
measurement practices, dierent material settings may thereby give rise to
23 E.g. (Vihalemm 1979) about interdependence of theory (also pre-theoretical world view)
and practice.
24 See (Tal 2011a) for an example of multiple realisability; the case of standard second.
25 See also (Heidelberger 2003, 148–149) about the generalisation of electricity as a phe-
nomenon.
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slightly dierent units.26 I would also contend the reverse: that dierent
settings meant to measure the same attribute still literally refer to dierent
properties with their outcomes—in the sense indicated in the previous sec-
tion as sets of properties comprising the target measurand and all the “con-
founding circumstances”—either due to dierent axiomatics (in terms of
measurement theory) underlying the instruments (a ruler directly measur-
ing length, or an acoustic oscillation indirectly measuring length),27 or due
to material idiosyncrasies (two rulers of dierent or even of the same ma-
terial are not quite the same). But even if dierent measuring instruments
aimed at one and the same attribute operate quite dierently and thus lit-
erally measure dierent properties, due to the unifying scientic approach
and stabilising practice they can, and for the practical and pragmatic aims
of science they must, be treated as measuring the same property (Tal 2011b).
I put forward that treating the world as ERSs, or as NMs, is in two ways
pragmatic. Firstly, this justies the use of handy mathematical theories in
accounting for and manipulating with the world, hence assuming apodic-
tic calculability and predictability of the world, an “underlying ideal reality”
(Hand 2004, 36). AlsoWoodward’s preference to link reality to stability—as
he takes simple phenomena to be ontically primary to noisy data—is prag-
matic in the sense that it assumes a simple world and thence a simple treat-
ment of the world. Instead of arithmetics of things (Suppes and Zinnes 1962,
3)—of all the varied kinds of things that would provoke various individual
accountings—there are a few arithmetics of numbers that can account for
sundry things irrespective of their idiosyncrasies.
Secondly, this approach justies bringing evermore of thematerial world
under mathematical treatment. Matter is thought of as fuzzy because of in-
volving numerous confounding circumstances. e quantication of un-
certainties and noise, conceptual and mathematical modelling of measure-
ment errors, serve the assumption that the world really consists of simple
phenomena and can be treated as potentially comprehensible with well de-
ned models. us by mathematising the treatment of what is called noise
and uncertainties, ever fuzzier matter is brought under mathematical treat-
ment on theoretical and practical levels. To this end, D’Agostini (1999, 7,
emphasis added) presents the denition in ISO Guide of “a true value of
the measurand” guiding determination of error: “a value compatible with
the denition of a given particular quantity.” According to this denition,
there is no absolute basis of comparison for discerning genuine results from
26 See, e.g. (Hand 2004, 236–238) for units related to electricity.
27 is undermines, besides the notions of representational and pragmatic measurement,
also the distinctions between direct and indirect measurement, fundamental and derived
measurement, and intrinsic and extrinsic attributes given by (Hand 2004, 16, 28).
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noise. D’Agostini considers this denition more useful in actual measuring
and test situations than the idealised one of “the true value” for permitting
more of the measured matter to be interpreted in terms of the theory ap-
plied to it—also in cases where measurements are dicult or impossible to
reproduce—thus enhancing plasticity of experimental practices and stability
of scientic theories.
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